The paper presents three different reconstructions of the 1980s boom of game theory and its rise to the present status of indispensable tool-box for modern economics. The first story focuses on the Nash refinements literature and on the development of Bayesian games. The second emphasizes the role of antitrust case law, and in particular of the rehabilitation, via game theory, of some traditional antitrust prohibitions and limitations which had been challenged by the Chicago approach. The third story centers on the wealth of issues classifiable under the general headline of "mechanism design" and on the game theoretical tools and methods which have been applied to tackle them. The bottom lines are, first, that the three stories need not be viewed as conflicting, but rather as complementary, and, second, that in all stories a central role has been played by John Harsanyi and Bayesian decision theory.
Introduction
The aim of the paper is to present three alternative explanations for the post-1980 boom of noncooperative game theory. In previous works (see e.g. Giocoli 2003, Chs.4-6) I have explained how game theory as such 1 failed to receive a significant degree of attention by economists 2 in the first two decades after its "invention" by John von Neumann and John F. Nash, namely, the 1950s and 1960s. The simple question then is: how could it happen that a neglected sub-discipline managed in about a decade to conquer the "hearts and minds" of economists, eventually becoming the undisputed theoretical core of mainstream economics? 3 It is quite immediate to surmise that, if we accept 1980 (or, better, as will be detailed below, the last third of the 1970s) as the starting date for the rise of game theory, the events which sparked it must have taken place in the previous decade or so, namely, during the 1970s.
What I offer here are three explanations of the rise:
4 -the beginning of the literature on the refinements of Nash equilibrium -the reaction against Chicago antitrust theory and policy -the application of game-theoretic tools to mechanism design problems.
In my fore-mentioned works I have more or less explicitly argued for the first explanation, crediting the boom of game theory to the huge amount of research spent on chasing ever more refined characterizations of strategic rationality and game solutions. This literature originated from the pioneering work of 1994 Nobelists John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten who, in the second half of the 1960s, extended noncooperative theory to deal with, and actually solve, games of incomplete or imperfect information. In this paper I wish to go beyond this account: my main thesis is that what really caused the boom was the powerful combination between the refinements literature and the two other explanations. Indeed, it might even be argued that most of the former emerged just out of necessity, in order to tackle the concrete antitrust and mechanism design issues raised by the latter.
What goes totally untackled in the paper is a further concern which, as I argue below, is nonetheless crucial for a full reconstruction of the postwar history of game and decision theory.
How, when and why did the idea that rational agents should be modeled as Bayesian decisionmakers become, first, an accepted, and, later, the standard assumption in economic theory? Here I have no answer yet, but in the concluding § I will advance the suggestion that a promising research line goes in the direction of investigating the kind of decision theory which was being taught during the 1960s in top US business and management schools. Anyway, in what follows I will simply take for granted that a game theorist working in the second half of the 1970s was perfectly comfortable with the assumption of Bayesian decision theory as the kind of rationality to be attributed to players in a noncooperative setting.
The refinements literature and Harsanyi's contribution
The most straightforward explanation of the 1980s triumph of game theory may be found in the socalled refinements literature. By this name it is meant the description of how the standard definition of a Nash equilibrium in a game can be sharpened by invoking additional criteria derived from decision theory (Govindan and Wilson 2007, 1) . The origin of this stream of research dates back to the 1950s, that is, immediately after John Nash had developed his solution concept for noncooperative games. It did not take long, in fact, for game theorists (including Nash himself: see Giocoli 2003, Ch.5; 2004) to raise those very issues which still lie at the roots of the refinements literature, viz., the problems of multiplicity, equilibrium selection and rational behavior under incomplete information. Take for instance Luce and Raiffa's 1957 classic. Within their overall negative evaluation of Nash equilibrium (see ibid., 112) , the authors put particular emphasis on the circumstance that the standard, fixed-point argument in favor of Nash's solution -namely, that of being an equilibrium notion with the property that knowledge of the theory supporting it would not lead any player to a choice different from that dictated by the theory itself -characterizes it as just a necessary condition of rational strategic behavior, but not a sufficient one. Multiplicity of equilibria in normal form games is widespread, so much so that, absent a convincing theory of how to select among them, Luce and Raiffa had to conclude that <<… [Nash] equilibrium notion does not serve in general as a guide to action.>> (ibid., 172).
Luce and Raiffa also realized that the normal form, while providing a general, and quite userfriendly, tool for modeling strategic situations, entailed the suppression of all information issues.
Indeed, in the normal form no player can get any private information until after she has chosen her strategy for the whole game, that is, until there is nothing left she can do apart from mechanically implementing the strategy itself (see Myerson 2004, 3) . This of course falls short of being a proper representation of strategic behavior in dynamic situations, that is, in all games where a player is called to act repeatedly, and thus can draw inferences about the other players' strategies, preferences or private information as the game proceeds. Normal form Nash equilibria simply do not distinguish between the case in which each player commits initially and irrevocably to her strategy throughout the game, and the case in which a player continually re-optimizes as the game goes on. The distinction is lost because the definition of Nash equilibrium presumes that players will surely adhere to their initially chosen strategies. As Govindan and Wilson (2007, 3-4) put it, <<Most refinements of Nash equilibrium are intended to resurrect this important distinction. Ideally one would like each Nash equilibrium to bear a label telling whether it assumes implicit commitment or relies on incredible threats or promises. Such features are usually evident in the equilibria of trivially simple games, but in more complicated games they must be identified augmenting the definition of Nash equilibrium with additional criteria.>>.
Remarkably, Luce and Raiffa did try to modify the standard definition of a game by allowing players to have incomplete information, and thus to hold beliefs rather than knowledge, about the strategic situation (see Luce and Raiffa 1957, §12.4) . Unfortunately, their complicated technique led nowhere.
Despite the early discovery of the limits of Nash equilibrium, we can safely date the real beginning of the refinements literature to Selten 1965. In that paper Selten explicitly raised the issue of the adequacy of the normal form, and of the related necessity to investigate more carefully the extensive form, as the central questions of noncooperative game theory. 5 This opened large, uncharted prairies along two research lines. 6 On the one side, Selten's acknowledged the all-toofrequent case of games whose normal form representation had too many Nash equilibria, some of which seemed clearly irrational when the game was examined in extensive form in that they required an agent to play a strategy she would refuse to play if actually called to. This forced the imposition of stronger necessary and sufficient conditions for rational strategic behavior in extensive form games -stronger, that is to say, than Nash's necessary condition for the normal form. As is well known, Selten's answer to the problem of excluding intuitively unreasonable Nash equilibria was the new notion of subgame perfect equilibrium, but this was just the first entry in what in the next couple of decades became a long list of ever more refined equilibrium concepts.
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On the other side, at the root of Selten's 1965 puzzle lay the intuitively appealing idea that extensive form games sharing the same normal form should have the same set of solutions. Hence, further refinements of Nash equilibrium have been developed which may be directly applied to games in normal form. 8 These refinements enjoy the property that the solution theory based upon them, when applied to the extensive form, guarantees that extensive form games sharing the same normal form representation will have the same solutions.
Many refinements have been proposed. 9 Generally speaking, each contribution to this literature starts with a list of the properties which appear theoretically desirable for a refinement concept to enjoy. Especially in the literature's early years, the dream was to find the "magic bullet", i.e., the solution concept capable of solving all games, be they in normal or extensive form. While this dream -which was just a revised version of von Neumann's original goal of providing a complete characterization of rational strategic behavior (see von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953, 31 ) -was quickly abandoned, the search strategy followed by game theorists entailed that the refinements were mostly developed incrementally, one after the other, and often relying on ad hoc criteria.
Two major groups of refinements can be identified (see Govindan and Wilson 2007) . The first consists of those equilibrium notions which require sequential rationality as the game progresses.
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The other includes the notions which warrant the credibility of the equilibrium by considering perturbed games where every contingency -even very unlikely ones -occurs with positive probability. Thus, while refinements in the first group exclude unreasonable equilibrium by imposing a stronger notion of rationality upon the players, those in the second accept that players may make "mistakes", thereby making no equilibrium truly unreasonable.
6 Note that the distinction is made here just for expository reasons, since the two lines have never been really separated. 7 Another landmark notion worth mentioning here is the sequential equilibrium in Kreps and Wilson 1982. 8 See Myerson 1991, 215. 9 To mention a very rough datum, a simple Google scholar search for the expressions "refinements of Nash equilibrium" and "Nash equilibrium refinements" delivers about 400 hits. 10 A strategy is sequentially rational for player i at information state s if i would actually want to do what this strategy specifies for him at s when information state s actually occurred.
Yet, even the ultimate and most sophisticated refinement may still allow for multiple equilibria in many games (the most obvious example being the well-known Battle of the Sexes). This explains why, following Myerson (1991, 241-2) , it is correct to distinguish between true refinements on the one side -namely, solution concepts intended to offer a more accurate characterization of rational behavior in games -and selection criteria on the other. The latter are any objective standard which can be used to determine the focal equilibrium expected by every player to occur in case of multiplicity. Note that a selection criterion, differing from a refinement, requires more than the players' rationality. What is also called for is, in Myerson's terminology, a "cultural" feature of the players' environment capable of inducing them to focus on a specific selection criterion, so much so that if players, on account of the common cultural feature, expect each other to behave according to one of the equilibria, then they may rationally fulfill these expectations. Yet, I now recognize that the limit of an explanation based on these statements is that it is too "internal" to the subdiscipline of game theory and so it downplays the extent of the revolution brought to the broader realm of economics by the other founding paper of the refinements literature, namely, Harsanyi's landmark analysis of games with imperfect information, published in three parts in Management Science (Harsanyi 1967-68) . The content and the import of Harsanyi's paper have been masterfully reconstructed by Roger Myerson in various papers (see Myerson 1999 Myerson , 2001 Myerson , 2004 Myerson , 2008 . Here I just wish to highlight a few features.
First of all, note that Harsanyi's motivation also stemmed from the limitations of the Nash equilibrium for normal form games. As I said before, a game in normal form assumes that all players have the same information, or, as Myerson effectively puts it, that <<the "beginning of the game" must be a point in time when all players have the same information.>> (Myerson 1999 (Myerson , 1076 ). Yet, this restriction is unacceptable when we have to model situations where agents have some, long-standing differences in information, because <<…it demands that our model must begin with some point from the distant past.>> (ibid.). Harsanyi 1967-68 showed how to avoid this difficulty by constructing a Bayesian game of incomplete information.
A (consistent) Bayesian game is one where the players' different beliefs at the beginning of the game are due to their having observed different random variables about which all players have common prior beliefs. This entails that, thanks to Harsanyi, it is not necessary anymore to impose ad hoc informational differences whenever the analysis of real world phenomena requires them, because these differences can themselves be explained in terms of the heterogeneity of players'
experiences. In other words, while in a Bayesian game, the game model itself is assumed to be common knowledge among players, we do not need to assume anymore that players have the same information.
The players' different information is described by a collection of random variables, called the players' types, each of which is private information of one player. The actual value of each players' type is omitted from the model, which instead includes a probabilistic description of what each type of each player believes about the other players' types. 12 This corresponds to a very peculiar modeling strategy, because the perspective from which Harsanyi's games are analyzed is that of someone who only knows the information common to all players, i.e., the information summarized by the game model itself. Hence, the Harsanyian analyst is asked to deny herself the possibility to exploit any knowledge of any player's actual type: such an information, being a private one, must be treated as a random variable because this the only way the analyst may correctly appreciate the uncertainty of the other players who do not know it and can only formulate beliefs about it. These beliefs are said to be consistent if the players' type-contingent beliefs can all be derived by Bayes's rule from the fore-mentioned common prior distribution.
12 More specifically, a Bayesian game is a mathematical model that specifies: 1) the set of players, 2) the set of feasible actions for each player, 3) the set of possibly types for each player, 4) each player's expected payoffs for every possible combination of all players' actions and types, 5) for each possible type of each player, a probability distribution over the << [Harsanyi's] influence has been the basis for a profound revolution in social science. Any academic discipline must rely on a general methodology to provide a framework for inquiry and debate.
[…] After Harsanyi's (1967-8) , that is to say, the idea that any economic system exhibits a spontaneous tendency to reach a situation of Pareto-optimal equilibrium provided it is not disturbed by exogenous interferences, like those by government, antitrust authorities or courts. Secondly, an empirical pillar. According to Chicago economists, the data and observations used to found and validate the SCP approach were simply wrong: for example, the structuralist claim that the causation went from the number of firms in a market to the amount of profits each firm could earn had actually to be reversed since only the most efficient, i.e., most profitable, firms were those capable of surviving competition. The third pillar had to do with the viewpoint from which to evaluate competition and explain business conduct. Given that Pareto-optimality was the "natural" situation of markets (see the first pillar), efficiency explanations of business behavior had to be privileged with respect to market power ones.
Two corollaries followed. First, the focus of antitrust analysis should be on market performance, as well as on the conduct determining it, while the structuralist viewpoint had to be abandoned.
Second, the measure of market performance had to be consumer welfare (<<…the only legitimate goal of antitrust…>> in the words of Bork 1978, 7). The fourth and final pillar was pragmatic, but perhaps even more important than the previous three. I refer to the special ability of Chicago scholars to translate their economic arguments into operational principles that courts and lawyers might easily understand and apply. business conducts had been declared per se legal, while a case-by-case evaluation was warranted for almost all the remaining types of behavior.
It is crucial for our story to realize that, exactly when the Chicago approach made its breakthrough, by convincing ever more US courts of the validity of the economic arguments supporting pro-competitive explanations of several, supposedly anti-competitive, business conducts -exactly then, a series of new results in industrial economics seemed to prove the contrary, namely, that there could well be an anti-competitive rationale behind these very same conducts! Remarkably, these results were all based on the application of game-theoretic tools to models of imperfect competition. And the kind of game-theory employed in these models was that developed in the 1970s by Harsanyi, Selten and all the other scholars of the refinements literature. The coincidence is so impressing that it seems reasonable to argue that, at least as far as industrial economics is concerned, and regardless of their ability to "sell" their ideas to legal scholars and courts, the Chicago economists' approach has never been dominant or mainstream. Indeed, since the early 1980s, the advent and quick rise to dominance in industrial economics of game-theoretic methods has set the record straight in the marketplace of ideas, so much so that it is now customary to speak of a post-Chicago approach to competition issues. Now, the question is: may we apply a post hoc, propter hoc logic and thus conclude that the boom of game theory has been caused, or induced, by the necessity to counter, in academic circles, as well as in courts, the Chicago attack against active antitrust enforcement? Let me exemplify this viewpoint by referring to the case of predatory pricing. By this expression it is meant, generally speaking, the case of a firm which sets prices at a level implying the sacrifice of profits in the shortrun in order to eliminate competition and get higher profits in the long run. 19 Hence, the two basic elements of predatory behavior are the existence of short-term loss, on the one side, and the existence of market power enabling the predator to raise prices in the long run and recoup the losses suffered during the predatory phase, on the other. The standard account of predatory behavior satisfies these two requirements. It is the so-called deep pocket story: a big firm may drive its small rivals out of business by exploiting its ability (due, for instance, to the extra profits earned in other markets) to survive for a significant period of time the losses originating from a below-cost (viz., predatory) price, while small firms have no such ability and are thus forced to eventually give up.
While this story sounds quite convincing, 20 a robust theory supporting it has been proposed only in the 1980s, by Benoit 1984. But, and here is the key point, Benoit's paper, as well as several others providing a rationale for predatory behavior, all stem from Harsanyi's formalization of games with incomplete information.
Predatory behavior has always been quite hard to assess. Indeed, the basic difficulty is implicit in its definition: how can a court distinguish low prices due to genuine competitive behavior from low prices due to the willingness to eliminate competition? This problem explains why, starting from the 1960s, the predation story became an easy target for the harsh criticism of Chicago scholars, who obviously denied that the observation of a "low" price charged by a firm endowed with market power might ever lead to an accusation of predatory behavior. The attack began with McGee 1958.
In that paper, various critiques were raised against the standard story. The two most important ones were, first, that the small firm, with a "small pocket", may well obtain funds from the financial market, thereby resisting against the predation, and, second, that it is far from clear that predatory behavior is the most profitable one for the big firm, given that there may well exist alternative, more profitable strategies (say, a merger).
McGee's paper, which fully reflected the Chicago view of antitrust, has had an enormous impact in the application of the School's approach to antitrust cases. In the words of McGee's 1980 reassessment of his earlier contribution, the key point is that <<… if they are to be broadly applicable, theories of business behavior should concentrate on policies that pay.>> (McGee 1980, 295) . In the case of predatory pricing his argument proved that this was not the case, that is, that there were no serious reasons to assume that the predator's total future gains -i.e., the motivation behind predation itself -could ever exceed the short term loss caused by the predatory strategy.
McGee's conclusion was that predatory pricing, if it ever existed, was quite rare and, thus, undeserving of the attention, and the resources, of competition authorities. Doing otherwise would imply a high number of "false positives", i.e., of wrong condemnations as predatory of simple price rebates, that is, of the first and foremost instance of competing behavior.
During the 1960s and 1970s various proposals came from SCP quarters in order to rescue the predation case from McGee's critiques. These attempts were characterized by a recourse to one form or the other of old-style, cost-based rules, the most significant one being Areeda and Turner's 1975 average variable cost rule. 21 The point is that none of these rules managed to effectively counter the gist of McGee's argument, namely, that there seemed to be no business rationale for the predation strategy in the first place. The dispute was eventually settled by the Supreme Court which, in the famous 1986 Matsushita case, embraced the Chicago story and concluded that "…predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful" and that "mistaken inferences in cases like this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect". Thus, "[i]f the factual context renders respondents' claims implausible -if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense -respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary…" 22 Nails in the coffin of predatory pricing, one might be tempted to say.
However, starting from the late 1970s game theory has offered some convincing explanations of why predatory pricing may, after all, be a sound, profit-maximizing business behavior. As remarked
by Motta (2004, 415-6) , the common thread in recent models of predation is that such a behavior may be explained only in a context of imperfect/incomplete information, that is, when players have some uncertainty. The key idea is that the predator may try to exploit the prey's less-than-perfect knowledge (or that of the outside investors who finance it) and thus behave so that to make the rival believe that no profits can be made in that industry. As a result, either the prey will exit the market, or a potential entrant will abstain from entering, or its lenders will not be willing to provide the necessary funds. For this manipulation of beliefs to be possible, it is necessary that some uncertainty exist: in a market where all firms have perfect knowledge, McGee's argument is correct and no predation would ever be observed because everybody knows beforehand either that the predator will be successful in its strategy to exclude the rival, who therefore will never costly challenge the incumbent, or that predation will be unsuccessful and thus will never be tried in the first place. Thus, what we have here is an instance of a real life business behavior which is simply inexplicable in a simple perfect information context and which can only find a rationale -and the related possibility of condemnation -in the richer analytical setup of imperfect/incomplete games.
Modern, game-theoretic models of predation can be divided into three broad categories:
reputation models, signalling models and financial market models. All date back, in their first versions, to the late 1970s -early 1980s and all share a common tool-box, whose key components are, on the one side, Harsanyi's setup for games of incomplete information and, on the other, the equilibrium concepts of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and sequential equilibrium. Let me briefly exemplify this literature by referring to one of its most famous papers, namely, Kreps and Wilson 1982a. 23 The key idea is that a price war today may find its rationale in the attempt to create a reputation of being a strong and aggressive incumbent to discourage future entry. Selten's chain store paradox (Selten 1978) had demonstrated that, in case of an entry game, the application of backward induction leads the entrant to always enter and be accommodated by the incumbent, regardless of the (finite) number of times the game is played. Hence, no predation would ever occur in such a game. Note that Selten's result bode ill for the success of game theory: once more, a logically impeccable game-theoretic reasoning, this time in the form of subgame perfect equilibrium, entailed an implausible description of real world behavior -a result that Selten himself deemed paradoxical as he acknowledged that the desire to build a reputation of toughness capable of deterring further entry seemed to provide a good reason for real world incumbents to prey on entrants. Kreps and Wilson simply introduced some uncertainty on the incumbent's type (i.e., whether weak or strong) and proved that this sufficed to show that predation would occur in a PBE.
Assume there is some probability that the incumbent is not weak. A strong incumbent would fight entry by setting a low price: yet, this is not predatory behavior, but just a (Chicago-style) manifestation of the incumbent's competitive edge. The key issue, however, is that now a weak incumbent also has an incentive to fight entry by setting a low price: this in order to make the potential future entrants believe the incumbent is a strong one and thus they had better avoid entry.
But setting a low price is precisely an instance of predatory behavior: a weak incumbent, in fact, is deemed to lose money from such a low price and its losses can only be justified in view of, and recouped thanks to, the deterrence of future entries. Kreps and Wilson's main insight is clear-cut:
even a small departure from perfect information might justify predatory pricing in a finite, but long enough, horizon. 
§3. Mechanism design problems
Mechanism design theory (MDT henceforth) provides a unified framework for analyzing the great variety of institutions (such as markets and firms) which allocate economic resources, with an emphasis on incentives and private information and the goal of identifying optimal institutions.
More specifically, a mechanism is a specification of how economic decisions are determined as a function of the information that is known by individuals in the economy. The basic insight of MDT is that incentive constraints should be considered as important as resource constraints in the formulation of any economic problem. In every situation where individuals have private information and may perform hard-to-monitor actions, agents must be given the proper incentives to share their information and exert the due efforts. MDT tells us that the need to provide those incentives may impose constraints on the economic system whose relevance is no lower than that of traditional scarcity constraints.
The previous summary corresponds to a modern view of a "mechanism" and of MDT (in fact, it is taken from Myerson 1989). In his 1960 seminal work, Leonid Hurwicz defined a mechanism simply as a communication system in which participants send messages to each other and to a message center, and where a pre-specified rule assigns an outcome, like an allocation of goods, for every to emphasize the "cost side" of mechanisms, i.e., how to design an efficient mechanism from the viewpoint of informational and computational costs. Incentive issues came to the fore only in 1972, following Hurwicz's second seminal contribution, which first formulated the notion of incentivecompatibility (Hurwicz 1972), thus paving the way to the modern analysis of mechanisms where self-interested agents are endowed with private information. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if it is a dominant strategy for each participant to report her private information truthfully. In addition, every agent must be willing to participate to the mechanism, that is, participation should not make her worse off. Notably, Hurwicz 1972 demonstrated a negative result, namely, that in a standard exchange economy no incentive-compatible mechanism satisfying the participation constraint can produce Pareto-optimal outcome. In other words, the existence of private information precludes the attainment of economic efficiency. counterpart. Yet, the crucial insight of the revelation principle is that for any equilibrium of any general mechanism, there is an equivalent incentive-compatible DRM. This entails that, by limiting our analysis to mathematically handy incentive-compatible DRM, we can characterize the outcome of every possible equilibrium of every possible realistic mechanism with no loss of generality.
Thus, thanks to the revelation principle the analyst may deal with seemingly intractable problems of mechanism design under conditions of private information by simply investigating the properties of the set of linear inequalities of the corresponding incentive-compatible DRM.
The revelation principle has been first formulated by Gibbard 1973 who followed Hurwicz in the use of dominant strategies as equilibrium concept. The decisive step forward came at the end of the 1970s when several researchers (Holmstrom 1977; Rosenthal 1978; Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin 1979; Myerson 1979) independently re-formulated the principle, in the case of a purely informational problem (i.e., adverse selection), applying a broader solution concept, Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 30 In the case of a pure moral hazard problem the principle had been already developed view, the common, and undisputed, hero of all the three narratives and to highlight the important piece of information that is still missing in order to complete our story.
The common hero is, little surprise at that, John Harsanyi. As I have argued at length above, his Among the unsolved puzzles, features that of understanding how Bayesian decision-making, which
Leonard Savage had proposed in the early 1950s as a criterion for teaching his colleague statisticians how to draw the most correct inferences from their data (Savage 1954), could turn out being a substantial failure in statistics (where most statisticians happily stuck to the classical inferential techniques Savage so openly criticized) and, at the same time, an enormous success in economics. When did rational economic agents become Bayesian decision makers? The question is clearly crucial for our story because the popularity of Harsanyi's game theory could never materialize without Bayesian rationality having already entered the tool-box of a sufficient number of mainstream economists. The fact that rationality considerations could be explicitly extended, in
Harsanyi's setup, to cover each player's beliefs about the rivals' beliefs about herself, or, in other words, that players could be modeled as capable of also theorizing, according to rationality criteria, on the other players' thought processes, was very far from granted. subjective probability distributions all the uncertainty they face, including the actions and beliefs of other players, and ii) maximize their utilities subject to these distributions. But this is something that, to make just a name, John von Neumann would have never accepted, as he time and again denied that agents in a game might perform the first activity, let alone the second one. Subjective course, statistical decision theory was a crucial ingredient in operations research teaching. In a nutshell, I believe that a further, interesting question is the following one: did the Bayesian revolution in game and decision theory come to economics from business, rather than statistical, studies? The (in)famous "five-minute science" eagerly awaits its small revenge…
